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*For essential feedback, thanks to Klaus Abels, Itamar Kastner, Nathan Klinedinst, Keir Moulton, Tim Stowell, Yasutada Sudo, and Wataru Uegaki; also, audiences at CLS 52, UCLA Round Table, London Semantics Day, and UCL PhD Day.

EMBEDDED NOMINALS AND CLAUSES

Many verbs may embed both DPs and *that-*clauses, often giving rise to systematic meaning alternations. Example here: *explain* (Pietroski 2000).

- (1) a. Amanda explained [CP that Nigel resigned]. explanans
 - b. Amanda explained [DP the fact that Nigel resigned]. *explanandum*

Generalization: an embedded *that*-clause specifies the content of the eventuality introduced by the verb, whereas an embedded DP is interpreted in a potentially idiosyncratic way.

- (2) a. Bogdan fears [CP that he is balding].
 - b. Bogdan fears [DP the rumour that he is balding].
- (3) a. Clark imagined [CP that his sister got married].
 - b. Clark imagined [DP the rumour that his sister got married].

Pietroski's (2000) analysis: *explain* assigns THEME an embedded DP, and CONTENT to an embedded CP. Generalization in terms of syntactic category – can be extended to other verbs (see Kastner 2015).

[(1a)] =
$$\lambda w.\exists e [AGENT_w(e) = a \land explaining_w(e) \land CONT_w(e) = \lambda w'.resigned_{w'}(n)]$$

[(1b)] =
$$\lambda w.\exists e [AGENT_w(e) = a \land explaining_w(e) \land CONT_w(e) = \lambda w'.resigned_{w'}(n)]$$

Question here: *why* are *that*-clauses always interpreted as content-providers, whereas DPs are interpreted more idiosyncratically? Surprising if both are full-fledged arguments.

AGAINST A SYNTACTIC ACCOUNT

Propositional DPs (Moltmann 2003, 2013):

- DPs headed by thing: the same thing, a different thing, most things, two things, something, everything, etc.
- ▶ The simplex *wh*-phrase *what*.
- Anaphoric expressions such as *it* and *that*.
- Null operators in comparatives (Kennedy & Merchant 2000)

Pietroski's prediction (false): explain assigns propDPs the THEME θ -role.

- (4) a. Amanda explained something namely, that Nigel resigned.
 - b. Amanda explained something namely, the fact that Nigel resigned.

PROPOSITION-TO-PROPERTY SHIFT


Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2009, 2015) propose that *that*-clauses denote properties of individuals with propositional content. I implement this idea via the covert functional head F_{PROP} , which I take to denote \mathscr{F}_{cont} : a (partial) function in the metalanguage that maps a world of evaluation w and an individual x to x's propositional content (a set of worlds) in w.

$$\lambda P.\iota x[P(x)] \qquad \lambda x.\operatorname{fact} \wedge \mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(x) = \lambda w.\operatorname{buffoon}_{w'}(n) \\
\text{the} \qquad \qquad \lambda x.\operatorname{fact}_{w}(x) \qquad \lambda x.\mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(x) = \lambda w'.\operatorname{buffoon}_{w'}(x) \\
n_{w} \qquad \sqrt{fact} \qquad F_{\operatorname{PROP},w} \qquad \lambda w'.\operatorname{buffoon}_{w'}(n) \\
\text{that Nigel is a buffoon}$$

SEMANTICS OF EMBEDDING

- Logical Forms are *neo-Davidsonian* (Parsons 1990, Lasersohn 1995)
- No type distinction between *individuals* and *eventualities* (Lasersohn 1995)

Core claim: *that*-clauses are semantically modifiers. They compose with verbs via *Predicate Modification* (Heim & Kratzer 1998).




- $[1] = \lambda x. \mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(x) = \lambda w'. \text{resigned}_{w'}(n)$
- $[1] = \lambda x. explaining_{w}(x)$
- $[3] = PM([1])([2]) = \lambda x.explaining_w(x) \land$ $\mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(x) = \lambda w'.resigned_{w'}(n)$

SEMANTICS OF PROPOSITIONAL DPS

Claim: PropDPs are special, because they can denote/quantify over higher-order objects.


$$[[that_{1}]]^{g} = g(1, \langle e, t \rangle)$$

$$[[something_{w}]] = \lambda Q_{\langle et, t \rangle} . \exists P_{\langle e, t \rangle} [(\forall x, y [(P(x) \land P(y)) \rightarrow (\mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(x) = \mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(y))]) \land Q(P)]$$



$$\mathbb{I} \mathbb{1} = \lambda w. \exists P_{\langle e,t \rangle} [(\forall x, y [(P(x) \land P(y)) \rightarrow (\mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(x) = \mathscr{F}_{cont}(w)(y))]) \land \\
\exists e_e [\text{explaining}_w(e) \land \text{AGENT}_w(e) = a \land P(e)]]$$

Believe-type verbs can embed *that*-clauses, contDPs and propDPs, whereas *think*-type verbs can only embed *that*-clauses and propDPs. This boils down to *argument structure*, as opposed to case/c-selection (cf. Grimshaw 1979, Pesetsky 1982).




(**Putative**) **generalization:** there are no verbs which obligatorily embed a *that*-clause, but disallow a DP. This is mysterious if *that*-clauses are arguments.

THE DP REQUIREMENT REVISITED

The type *e* **requirement:** the gap of a fronted CP (sentential subject or topic) must be a DP of type *e* (cf. e.g., Moulton 2015).

- (5) a.?* that John will leave, Mary hopes t.b.That John will leave, Mary believes t.
- (6) That Shirley is upset, Abed explained *t*. *Xexplanans*; ✓ *explanandum*

This follows if the general algorithm for interpreting movement (including CP fronting) is *trace conversion* (or something like it) (Sauerland 1998). A Fox & Johnson (2016) style multi-dominance implementation:



SELECTED REFERENCES: ♦ Fox, Danny & Kyle Johnson. 2016. QR is restrictor sharing.